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Abstract
Recent literature shows that, when international financial trade is restricted to
autarky or a single bond, there are internal and external welfare trade-offs that
imply optimal monetary policy, in principle, deviates from inflation targeting in
order to offset real exchange rate misalignments. This paper develops a more re-
alistic model of incomplete markets, where there is international trade in multiple
assets. The analysis shows that the presence of multiple assets creates a potentially
powerful interaction between monetary policy and household portfolio allocation.
This interaction is, by definition, not present when there is financial autarky or
a single tradeable bond and this paper shows that the interaction with portfolio
allocation can imply that optimal monetary policy generates a quantitatively much
more significant stabilisation of the real exchange rate gap than implied by simpler
models of financial market incompleteness.
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1 Introduction
To what extent should the design of monetary policy rules explicitly account for open
economy factors such as current account imbalances or exchange rate misalignments?
Recent literature has emphasised the key role of imperfections in international financial
markets in creating a trade-off between internal and external objectives of monetary
policy. The aim of this paper is to extend the analyse of this question to a model with
international trade in multiple assets but where there are insufficient assets to hedge
against all sources of shocks simultaneously. We show that monetary policy can have
a significant effect on welfare via its impact on portfolio allocation. This provides a
strong incentive to direct monetary policy away from internal objectives (i.e. inflation
stabilisation) and towards an external objective (i.e. stabilisation of the real exchange
rate around its first-best level).
This paper is a contribution to a long-running literature on optimal monetary policy
in open economies. The early literature emphasised that open economy factors need have
no explicit role in the design of optimal cooperative monetary policy rules. For instance,
Benigno and Benigno (2003) showed that optimal cooperative monetary policy should
focus on targeting the rate of inflation of producer prices.1 These authors demonstrate
that a policy of inflation targeting is sufficient to close all internal and external welfare
gaps. There is therefore no trade-off between internal and external policy objectives.2
This early open economy literature, however, focused on models where international
financial markets are complete. Households can therefore fully hedge against country
specific income shocks. More recent literature has begun to analyse monetary policy in
open economy models where financial markets are incomplete. For instance, Corsetti
et al (2010, 2018) analyse cooperative monetary policy in a context where international
financial trade is absent or is restricted to a single non-contingent bond. They show that,
in contrast to the previous literature, when international financial markets are incomplete
there are significant internal and external trade-offs that prevent optimal cooperative
1In this paper we focus on optimal cooperative policy, i.e. a world where policy is set at a world level
in order to maximise world welfare. In some special cases, see for instance Clarida et al (2002) and Gali
and Monacelli (2005), optimal cooperative policy is identical to non-cooperative policy, but this is not
true in general.
2This early literature is in effect a direct extension to an open economy setting of the basic closed
economy results of Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). The only difference between
the closed and open economy results is in the choice of price index for the inflation target - consumer
prices for a closed economy and producer prices for an open economy.
1
policy from simultaneously closing all welfare relevant gaps.3
The basic intuition for the Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) results is simple to explain.
A policy of producer price inflation targeting reproduces the flexible price outcome and
therefore eliminates the welfare costs associated with staggered price setting. But the
flexible price equilibrium is not fully optimal because international financial markets are
imperfect and thus cross-country income risks are not optimally shared. A corollary of
this is that the real exchange rate and trade balance will deviate from their first best
outcomes. Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) show that optimal cooperative policy deviates from
inflation targeting and takes account of external welfare gaps and acts to offset “exchange
rate misalignments.”
The results in Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) clearly point to a potentially important
deviation from the standard policy prescription of inflation targeting. There is however
a significant limitation to Corsetti et al ’s work. In Corsetti et al (2010) the analysis of
imperfect international financial markets is restricted to a model with financial autarky,
while in Corsetti et al (2018) the analysis of imperfect financial markets is represented by
a single-bond economy. These structures provide important insights into the implications
of imperfect financial trade but they are obviously not a good representation of modern
international financial markets.
The main objective of the current paper is to analyse optimal monetary policy in
more general models of imperfect international financial trade than those considered in
Corsetti et al (2010, 2018). Our analysis begins with a simple model which adds one extra
asset compared to Corsetti et al (2010, 2018), so there is trade in two nominal bonds.
Despite the additional asset our model continues to be one where financial markets are
incomplete (because there are not sufficient assets to hedge against all shocks). We
show that this small change in financial market structure has an important qualitative
and a potentially large quantitative effect on optimal cooperative policy compared to
Corsetti et al (2010, 2018). Corsetti et al ’s (2010, 2018) analysis shows that optimal
cooperative policy deviates from inflation targeting most significantly for small values of
the international trade elasticity and when prices are set in the currency of the consumer
(local currency pricing, LCP). At higher values of the trade elasticity the deviations
3Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) focus on optimal monetary policy in a symmetric two-country world.
Benigno (2009) analyses an asymmetric world with incomplete financial markets and shows how optimal
monetary policy differs between net-debtor and net-creditor countries. De Paoli (2010) analyses monetary
policy for a small open economy and shows how optimal policy depends on the degree of financial
integration.
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from inflation targeting are quantitatively small. In contrast, our results show that, with
international trade in two bonds, there are quantitatively large deviations from inflation
targeting for a wide range of values of the trade elasticity. These large deviations arise in
terms of welfare, the optimal policy rule and variances of critical variables. In particular,
we show that optimal cooperative policy implies a significant stabilisation of the real
exchange rate gap relative to inflation targeting
We are further able to show that the critical difference between the single-bond case
and the two-bond case arises specifically because, in the two-bond case, monetary policy
is able to change portfolio returns and the composition of the equilibrium portfolio. In
effect monetary policy achieves a significant amount of leverage on risk sharing through
its influence on portfolio returns and portfolio allocation. This is a mechanism which
does not exist in the single-bond case.
Having demonstrated the basic result in a simple model with a limited range of sto-
chastic shocks, two nominal bonds and a very simple policy rule, we extend the analysis
in a number of directions. We add further sources of shocks, we allow for trade in equities
as well as nominal bonds and we consider a more general version of the policy rule. We
also consider local currency pricing. We show that our basic result carries over to these
more general cases.
Because our model allows for international trade in multiple assets it is obviously
necessary to compute equilibrium gross portfolios. As just explained, a crucial mechanism
at work in our model is that the size and composition of these portfolios depends on the
properties of the monetary rule. There is therefore an interaction between policy choice
and portfolio choice. Equilibrium portfolios are computed using techniques developed in
recent literature (see Devereux and Sutherland (2010a, 2011a) and Tille and vanWincoop
(2010)). The combining of these techniques with the analysis of optimal policy is an
important innovation of this paper.4
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Our definition
of welfare and the characterisation of monetary policy is described in Section 3 and our
methodology for deriving optimal policy rules in the presence of endogenous portfolio
choice is described in Section 4. The main results of the paper are presented in Section 5
and the results from an extended version of the model are described in Section 6. Section
4Devereux and Sutherland (2008) consider a simple case where optimal monetary policy can be
analysed alongside endogenous portfolio choice. They show that, in a special restricted case, strict
inflation targeting reproduces the full risk sharing outcome, so there is no trade-off between internal and
external policy objectives in that very restricted case.
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7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Our main analysis is based on a model of two countries with two main sources of shocks.
In later sections we consider an extended version of the model with a number of other
sources of shocks. The model shares many of the same basic features of the closed economy
models developed by Christiano et al (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). It is based
on the open economy model developed in Devereux et al (2014).
Households consume a basket of home and foreign produced final goods. Final goods
are produced by monopolistically competitive firms which use intermediate goods as their
only input. Final goods prices are subject to Calvo-style contracts. Intermediate goods
are produced by perfectly competitive firms using labour and real capital as inputs.
Intermediate goods prices are perfectly flexible. The capital stock is fixed. Households
supply homogeneous labour to perfectly competitive firms producing intermediate goods.
In the benchmark version of the model we allow for shocks to home and foreign TFP
and home and foreign household preferences and there is international trade in nominal
bonds denominated in the currency of each country. Given the range of shocks, trade
in two bonds is be sufficient to provide full risk sharing. This is therefore a model of
incomplete financial markets. This is a key feature of the model.
The following sections describe the home country in detail. The foreign country is
identical. An asterisk indicates a foreign variable or a price in foreign currency.
2.1 Households

















where   0   0, ∆  0 () is the consumption of household , () is labour
supply,  is the discount factor and Ψ are stochastic shocks which affect consumption
preferences. We assume Ψ = Ψ̄ exp(Ψ̂) where Ψ̂ = ΨΨ̂−1 + Ψ 0 ≤ Ψ  1 and Ψ
is a zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shock with  [Ψ] = 
2
Ψ
Taste shocks in the form of Ψ are emphasised by Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) because
they create a strong role for current account dynamics and thus potentially create a strong
4
welfare trade-off for monetary policy when financial markets are incomplete. These taste
shocks will likewise play an important role in our analysis.






 0 = 1 (2)
where 0    , 0  ̄  1,  is aggregate home consumption and ̄ is a constant.
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where  and  are baskets of individual home and foreign produced goods. The
elasticity of substitution across individual goods within these baskets is   1. The
parameter  in (3) is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. The
parameter  measures the importance of consumption of the home good in preferences.
For   12, we have ‘home bias’ in preferences.
The price index associated with the consumption basket  is
 =
£
 1− + (1− ) 1−
¤ 1
1− (4)
where  is the price index of home goods for home consumers and  is the price
index of foreign goods for home consumers. The corresponding price indices for foreign
consumers are  and  
The flow budget constraint of the home country household is




where  denotes home country net external assets in terms of the home consumption
basket,  is the home nominal wage and Π is profits of all home firms. The final term
represents the total return on the home country portfolio where −1 represents the real
external holdings of asset  (defined in terms of the home consumption basket) purchased
at the end of period  − 1 and  represents the gross real return on asset . In our
5Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003),  is assumed to be taken as exogenous by individual de-
cision makers. The impact of individual consumption on the discount factor is therefore not internalized.
Note that this externality in principle creates a distortion in portfolio choice (in the sense that market
equilibrium portfolios will differ from the welfare maximising portfolio) - but in practice this distortion
is quantitively very small and has no significant implication for the analysis presented below.
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analysis, we initially allow for trade in  = 2 assets; home and foreign nominal bonds.
Note that  =
P
=1 .
Nominal bonds are assumed to be perpetuities, so for instance, home nominal bonds
represent a claim on a unit of home currency in each period into the infinite future. The
real price of the home bond is denoted  The gross real rate of return on a home
bond is thus +1 = (1+1 + +1) For the foreign nominal bond, the real





, where  = 
∗
  is the real exchange rate (where  is the price of the
foreign currency in terms of the home currency).6
For the purposes of comparison, we also consider a financial autarky version of the
model, which implies  = 0 and a single bond version, i.e.  = 1 where the only
internationally traded asset is a single real bond. For all financial structures we impose
the assumption that the steady state net foreign asset position is zero. This outcome is
implied by the assumed endogeneity of the discount factor given in (2).
2.2 Firms
Within each country firms are divided between final and intermediate sectors. Interme-
diate goods firms use labour and real capital. There is a unit mass of firms in both the
final and intermediate levels.
2.2.1 Final goods
Each firm in the final goods sector produces a single differentiated product. Sticky prices
are modelled in the form of Calvo (1983) style contracts with a probability of re-setting
price given by 1 − . In the basic version of the model we assume producer currency
pricing (PCP).
If firms use the discount factor Ω to evaluate future profits, then firm  chooses its















where () is the demand for home good  from home buyers and  () is the
6The assumption that bonds are perpetuities has no particular significance for our results. We have
experimented with a version of the model with single-period bonds and, while there are some quantitative
implications, there is no systematic qualitative differences compared to the results reported below.
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demand for home good  from foreign buyers and  is the price of the intermediate
good.7
2.2.2 Intermediate goods
The representative firm in the intermediate goods sector combines labour, , and capital,
, to produce output  using a standard Cobb-Douglas technology,  = 
1− 
We assume that the capital stock is fixed and that total factor productivity (TFP), 
is determined by  = −1 +  where   0 and  are zero mean normally
distributed i.i.d. shocks.













subject to the production function where  is the price of intermediate goods. Ω is
assumed to be the stochastic discount factor of shareholders of the firm. Equilibrium in
the labour market implies  = 
3 Monetary Policy and Welfare
The particular welfare measure on which we focus is the unconditional expectation of










where time subscripts are omitted to indicate that this is a measure of unconditional
expectation. Damjanovic et al (2008) argue that unconditionally expected utility provides
a useful alternative to Woodford’s (2003) ‘timeless perspective’ when analysing optimal
policy problems. For the purposes of this paper, unconditional expected utility provides
7In the basic model, where international asset trade is restricted to nominal bonds, all equity is
owned within each country, so the relevant discount factor for home and foreign firms is, respectively,
the discount factor for home and foreign households. When there is international trade in equities
the discount factor for firms will in principle be a weighted average of home and foreign household
discount factors, with the weight being determined by relative portfolio holdings of equity. However, as
a convenience simplification (which has trivial quantitative implications for equilibrium outcomes), even
when there is international trade in equities we impose the assumption that the firm discount factor in
each country corresponds to the household discount factor in each country.
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a simple and convenient way to compute welfare in a context where portfolio allocation
is endogenous. The next section provides a more detailed discussion of the complications
that arise in the simultaneous computation of welfare and equilibrium portfolios.
In common with Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) we focus on co-operative policy in the
sense that policy rules for each country are simultaneously chosen to maximise global
welfare, i.e. the sum of the home and foreign welfare measures. Note that, for simplicity,
throughout the remainder of this paper we refer to ‘optimal policy’ or the ‘optimal policy
rule’. This should be understood to imply optimal cooperative policy.
We model monetary policy in the form of a ‘targeting rule’. In general the optimal
targeting rule is model dependent. Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) show that the optimal
targeting rule for a model similar to ours includes measures of inflation and a number of
welfare gaps. Because of the complicated interaction between policy and portfolio choice
we do not derive the fully optimal policy rule for our model. Instead we use the form of
the optimal rule derived by Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) as an approximation for optimal
policy in our model.8
In fact, we start our analysis with the following very restricted form of targeting rule
(̂ − ̂−1) + D(D −D−1) = 0 (8)
where a hat over a variable represents its log deviation from the non-stochastic steady





+ ̂− (Ψ̂− Ψ̂∗)
(8) is the home-country targeting rule. There is a corresponding targeting rule for the
foreign country. Given that the model is symmetric, the coefficient of the of the for-
eign monetary rule is assumed to be identical to the coefficient of the home rule, with
appropriate changes of sign.
The targeting rule in (8) contains two terms. The first term represents producer
price (PPI) inflation. The central role of inflation stabilisation in optimal policy in New
8Recently, Fanelli (2017) has developed an approximation approach which allows a combined analysis
of portfolio allocation and optimal monetary policy in a simple theoretical framework which allows
monetary policy to be characterised as a fully optimal targeting rule which is very similar to (8). Fanelli
shows that optimal policy is a trade-off between a term which measures the output gap and price
dispersion and a term which measures risk sharing. Fanelli uses this framework to investigate the impact
of optimal policy on portfolio allocation and argues that there is a role for capital controls. Fanelli’s
analytical approach is useful for the analysis of simple models but is unlikely to be easily generalised to
more complex models of the type analysed in the later sections of this paper.
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Keynesian models is a well-known consequence of staggered price setting. In essence,
staggered price setting implies that inflation causes distortions in relative prices between
goods. Inflation is thus (other things equal) welfare reducing. It is also well-known that,
in the presence of PCP, the welfare-relevant measure of inflation is PPI inflation. This is
captured by the first term in (8).
The second term in the targeting rule is referred to by Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) as
a measure of ‘demand imbalances’. It measures deviations from full risk sharing. This
captures the welfare reducing effects of incomplete financial markets. To understand this
term note that, if a complete set of financial instruments were available for international
trade, equilibrium in financial markets would imply that the ratio of marginal utilities













+ ̂ = 0
This is the well-known risk sharing condition that is standard in open-economy models
with complete financial markets. It is thus clear that D in (8) is a measure of deviations
from full risk sharing. And it is clear that this term in the monetary policy rule captures
the extent to which monetary policy is adjusted in order to achieve greater risk sharing.
The simple targeting rule in (8) is sufficient to capture the key trade-off in monetary
policy between inflation stabilisation and deviations from risk sharing. There is just one
parameter in this rule, D so the policy optimisation problem is to choose the value of
D to maximise welfare (as measured by (7)).
Before proceeding to a discussion of the solution and optimisation procedure, it is
worth noting that the characterisation of policy as a targeting rule is (as argued by
Woodford (2003)) a convenient way to capture the welfare trade-offs faced by policy
makers without the need explicitly to model policy in terms of the optimal setting of a
policy instrument (such as the nominal interest rate). In cases where a instrument rule is
of interest it is, in principle, easy to derive such a rule once the optimal targeting rule has
derived. But note that it is often the case (as is true in the present model) that the optimal
targeting rule involves ‘gap variables’ - i.e. the difference between the actual and the first-
best level of a variable. This raises a practical problem for translating the targeting rule
into an implementable rule for monetary policy since the optimal instrument rule would
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then require full knowledge by the policymaker of the exogenous shocks that affect the
first-best level of variables. In the case of the model described above this would imply
that TFP and taste shocks are directly observable by policymakers. We acknowledge
that this is a practical problem that makes is difficult to translate the results presented
below into an implementable policy rule. This is a problem which (except for special
cases) also exists in a significant proportion of the monetary policy literature following
the approach of Woodford (2003) so our approach is no especially limited in this respect.
A separate point regarding implementation (which is again common to the majority
of the literature on optimal monetary policy) is that optimal policy is here being charac-
terised as rule which is specified in terms of the rate of inflation and the rate of change
in gap variables (in our case the distance from perfect risk sharing). There is an implicit
assumption that the optimal policy rule has been in place for many periods and the ob-
jective of policy is to respond to stochastic shocks around an optimal (stochastic) steady
state. But the policy problem that is often faced by policymakers is how to set policy
in an environment where past policy may have been far from optimal. The main policy
issue is therefore one of choosing an optimal path from a non-optimal initial point back
to the optimal (stochastic) steady state. In this respect a targeting rule (such as (8))
which specifies policy in terms of the rate of inflation and the change in deviations from
perfect risk sharing may be quite misleading as a guide to policy when the initial position
of the economy is far from its optimal steady state. In such a situation the policy maker
should be concerned about the level deviation from the perfect risk sharing - not the rate
of divergence (as implied by (8)). This is an interesting question for further research, but
an full analysis of this issue is well beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Model Solution, Country Portfolios and Policy Op-
timisation
Our objective in this paper is to analyse optimal monetary policy in the above specified
model. The key distinguishing feature of the above model, that sets it apart from much
of the existing literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies, is that it allows
for international trade in multiple assets.
Combining the analysis of optimal policy and endogenous portfolio choice presents
some new technical challenges. These challenges arise because there is an interaction
between policy choices and portfolio choice. Monetary policy affects the stochastic be-
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haviour of income and the hedging properties of assets and therefore affects optimal
portfolio choice. In turn, the equilibrium portfolio affects consumption and labour sup-
ply choices and thus affects macroeconomic outcomes and welfare. Thus, in addition to
the standard routes via which policy affects the macro economy, the optimal choice of
monetary policy must take account of the welfare effects of policy that occur via the
effects of policy on portfolio allocation. As will be demonstrated below, this mechanism
turns out to play a key role.9
Our solution approach follows the recent portfolio literature based on Devereux and
Sutherland (2011a) in computing equilibrium portfolios using a second order approxima-
tion to the portfolio selection equations for the home and foreign country in conjunction
with a first order approximation to the home and foreign budget constraints and the
vector of excess returns.
As already explained, we model monetary policy as a simple targeting rule (8). We
optimise the choice of coefficient in the targeting rule by means of a grid search algorithm.
Each grid point represents a different value for D in the targeting rule and for each grid
point there is an equilibrium portfolio allocation and a corresponding general macroeco-
nomic equilibrium and level of welfare. We use the Devereux and Sutherland (2011b)
portfolio solution approach to evaluate the equilibrium portfolio at each grid point. This
equilibrium portfolio is then used to compute macroeconomic equilibrium and evaluate
welfare at each grid point.
In conducting this analysis it necessary to be mindful of orders of approximation.
We approximate welfare up to second order. As is well-understood in the literature,
this requires that the overall model must also be solved up to second-order accuracy.
But note that, according to the principles outlined in Samuelson (1970), an order 
approximation of utility (in our case welfare) depends only on the order − 2 behaviour
of portfolios. Thus, in computing a second order approximation of welfare, we only require
the zero-order (or steady state) equilibrium portfolio. Hence the technique outlined in
Devereux and Sutherland (2011a) for computing the zero-order portfolio is sufficient for
our purposes.10
9In this paper we are making an assumption that policy choices are made in advance of trade in
asset markets. This implies that equilibrium portfolios depend on the choice of monetary policy rule. In
another paper, Senay and Sutherland (2013), we also emphasise how monetary policy can interact with
portfolio choice. But in that earlier paper we analyse non-cooperative policy in a world where financial
markets are complete. The interaction that occurs there is an explicitly distortionary effect that is quite
different to the mechanism being analysed in this paper.
10Note, the fact that welfare is based on expected utility is crucial in allowing us to focus on the
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Discount factor ̄ = 099  = 0005
Elasticity of substitution: individual goods  = 6
Elasticity of labour supply 1 = 05
Risk aversion  = 2
Share of home goods in consumption basket  = 0875
Elasticity of substitution: home and foreign goods  = 025 - 600
Share of labour in production  = 067
Calvo price setting  = 075
TFP shocks  = 095  = 0006
Taste shocks Ψ = 09 Ψ = 001
5 Optimal Monetary Policy in the Basic Model
The benchmark parameter values used in the following analysis are listed in Table 1.
Many of these parameter values are taken directly from Corsetti et al (2010, 2018). The
values of  (the elasticity of substitution between individual final goods) and  (the
Cobb-Douglas coefficient on labour in the production function of intermediate goods) are
chosen to yield a steady state monopoly mark-up of 11% and share of capital in output
of 033. The implied steady state share of dividends in GDP is approximately 015. The
Calvo parameter for price setting,  is chosen to imply an average period between price
changes of 4 quarters. The values of  (inverse labour elasticity) and  (risk aversion) are
consistent with the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007). The parameters
of the endogenous discount factor, ̄ and  are chosen to yield a steady state rate of
return of approximately 4%. The TFP and taste shock processes are based on Corsetti
et al (2010, 2018) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).
In this section we focus on optimal policy based on the simple policy rule given in (8).
zero-order portfolio. A second-order approximation of realised utility may include terms that depend
on the first-order behaviour of portfolio holdings multiplied by the first-order realisation of asset return
differentials. These terms, however, drop out when the expectations operator is applied and therefore
do not enter the expression for the second-order approximation of expected utility. See Devereux and
Sutherland (2010b) for a more detailed discussion of orders of approximation in the analysis of portfolios.
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This allows us to illustrate in detail the economic mechanism behind the effects we wish
to emphasise. Given the simplified policy rule, the only policy parameter that needs to
be determined is D It is therefore simple to investigate the effects of different values of
D on welfare, portfolio allocation and the variances of key variables.
Table 2 presents some key results for a range of values of the international trade
elasticity,  For comparison, this table shows the results for the two-bond case together
with the financial autarky and single-real-bond version of the model. For each value
of  and for each financial market structure the table shows the optimal value of D
the welfare difference between optimal policy and strict inflation targeting, the standard
deviations of a number of variables in the case of optimal policy and inflation targeting
and (for the two-bond case) equilibrium portfolios for the case of optimal policy and
inflation targeting. Welfare is measured in terms of the equivalent percentage of steady
state consumption. Standard deviations are reported in percentage terms. And portfolio
holdings are measured relative to steady state GDP. Given that, in this simple model,
there are just two assets that can be traded internationally, it is possible to represent
portfolio positions in terms of a single number. In this case we focus on the home
country’s portfolio position in the foreign nominal bond. As in Devereux and Sutherland
(2011a), we compute the zero-order (i.e. steady state) portfolio holding. In the steady
state it is assumed that net foreign assets are zero, so a positive holding of foreign bonds
must be matched by an equivalent negative (external) holding of home bonds.11
First consider the autarky and single-bond cases. These two cases correspond to
the financial market structures considered by Corsetti et al (2010, 2018). For both these
cases, and for all the values of  shown, the optimal value of D (derived numerically using
the search procedure outlined above) differs from zero. This indicates a deviation from
strict inflation targeting (which corresponds to D = 0). But notice that the difference
between the welfare level yielded by optimal policy and the welfare level yielded by strict
inflation targeting is very small for all values of  except for  = 12. The variance of
the real exchange rate gap and the variance of PPI inflation are also only marginally
11Note that, for all values of  gross portfolio positions are very large relative to steady state GDP.
Portfolio positions of this magnitude are obviously very unrealistic. It is only for very few countries
(usually tax havens) where external portfolio positions exceed 4 or 5 times GDP. It is not the purpose of
this analysis to match the data on international portfolio positions. Such an exercise is likely to require
consideration of transaction costs, informational asymmetries, and taxation and financial regulation
issues which go well beyond the scope of the analysis in this paper. Note that throughout our analysis
(again for the purposes of simplification) we also abstract from short selling constraints.
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Table 2: Results for the Benchmark Case
Trade elasticity,  025 05 075 15 3
Two Bonds
Optimal Policy rule D 3066 5663 −6281 −1686 −094
Welfare difference 00023 00020 00029 00036 00041
Portfolio (bond holdings) (optimal) −107 −44 58 307 795
(inf tar) −162 −84 −06 228 696
St Dev PPI Inflation (optimal) 0017 0044 0029 0010 0008
St Dev Output gap (optimal) 0011 0072 0045 0049 0042
(inf tar) 0014 0080 0119 0184 0237
St Dev RER gap (optimal) 129 090 061 027 010
(inf tar) 299 220 176 113 067
St Dev D (optimal) 088 069 055 033 019
(inf tar) 204 174 159 139 127
Autarky
Policy rule D 0017 −0085 −0010 −0003 000
Welfare difference 00003 00291 00000 00000 00000
St Dev PPI Inflation (optimal) 0026 0217 0007 0002 0000
St Dev RER gap (optimal) 845 1691 188 158 118
(inf tar) 852 1891 190 158 118
Single Bond
Policy rule D 0124 −0394 −0018 0027 0037
Welfare difference 00008 00430 00000 00000 00000
St Dev PPI Inflation (optimal) 0043 0287 0001 0003 0005
St Dev RER gap (optimal) 1267 2218 184 157 113
(inf tar) 1286 2465 184 157 113
Note: For each  and financia l structure the tab le shows the optim al value of D , the welfare d iff erence b etween optimal policy
and inflation targeting, standard deviations for optim al p olicy and inflation targeting and (for the two-bond case) equilibrium
portfo lios for optim al p olicy and inflation targeting. Welfare is measured in term s of the equivalent p ercentage of steady-state
consumption. Standard deviations are m easured in p ercentages. Portfo lio hold ings are m easured re lative to steady state GDP.
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different between the optimal policy and strict inflation targeting equilibria for all values
of  except for  = 12.
These results broadly match the results emphasised by Corsetti et al (2010, 2018)
who find that the differences between the optimal rule and inflation targeting are likely
to be very small except for low values of . The results in Table 2 go somewhat further
than Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) by showing that non-trivial differences between optimal
policy and inflation targeting are not strictly associated with low values of . It is more
correct to say that they arise at values of  close to 12. The significance of  = 12 is
easily explained. Given the values of other parameters (in particular the value of ) at
 = 12 the income and substitution effects of the terms of trade on the trade balance
almost cancel each other out. It follows therefore that at  = 12 the trade balance is
very insensitive to the terms of trade. In this case, the absence of financial trade (or the
highly restricted nature of financial trade) has significant implications for welfare because
the terms of trade and real exchange rate become very sensitive to shocks (as can be seen
in Table 2).12 There is therefore a strong incentive for the policymaker to deviate from
inflation targeting. At other values of  (either above or below 12) the trade balance is
more sensitive to changes in the terms of trade so the terms of trade and real exchange
rate are less volatile and the absence of financial trade (or the limited nature of financial
trade) is less significant for welfare. In this case the incentive to deviate from inflation
targeting is much reduced.
The general message from Table 2 is that our basic model reproduces the results of
Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) for the autarky and single-bond cases, i.e. optimal policy does
deviate from inflation targeting, but this appears to be quantitatively important only for
a restricted range of values of  (i.e. close to 12).13
12When the trade balance is relatively insensitive to changes in the terms of trade and there is no
financial market (i.e. there is financial autarky), any shock which causes a change in the trade balance
must cause a large change in the terms of trade in order to bring the trade balance back to zero. In turn,
this causes large fluctuations in consumption and work effort. So, in the vicinity of  = 12 consumption
and work effort are highly volatile. This creates a strong incentive for the policymaker to stabilise the
terms of trade and real exchange rate. This effect is less acute, but still present, when there is trade
in a single bond. See Bodenstein (2010) and Rabitsch (2012) for further discussion of how a number of
key welfare and equilibrium results can be reversed at particularly low values of the trade elasticity in
models similar to the one analysed here.
13Note that the standard deviations of the real exchange rate gap and the output gap (and other
variables) are all quite sensitive to the degree of persistence of TFP and taste shocks. However, the
persistence of shocks has no significant implications for the optimal policy rule or the difference between
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Now consider the two-bond case. The results in Table 2 show that again there is a
deviation between optimal policy and strict inflation targeting. But now the pattern of
results is quite different to that found in the autarky and single-bond cases. In the two-
bond case the welfare difference between optimal policy and inflation targeting is now
non-trivial for all values of  There are also relatively large differences between optimal
policy and inflation targeting in terms of the variances of the real exchange rate and the
output gap. In particular, optimal policy implies very significant stabilisation of the real
exchange rate gap compared to strict inflation targeting, regardless of the value 14
It is clear, therefore, that there is a significant qualitative and quantitative difference
between the two-bond case and the other financial market structures shown in Table 2.
This is somewhat surprising. In terms of the degree of market incompleteness it would
be natural to assume that the two-bond case is closer to complete markets than the
autarky and single-bond cases. One would therefore naturally predict that the optimal
policy rule in the two-bond case would be closer to the optimal policy rule in the complete
market case (i.e. strict inflation targeting) than it is in the autarky and single-bond cases.
However, the results in Table 2 contradict this intuition. It appears from the results in
Table 2 that trade in two bonds pushes optimal policy further away from strict inflation
targeting (at least for values of  different from 1/2) than in the autarky and single-bond
case. What is causing this counter-intuitive result?
The key to understanding the answer to this question is to consider in detail the role
of portfolio allocation. In the autarky and single-bond cases there is, by definition, no
portfolio decision for agents to make. In the autarky case there are no traded assets so
there is no portfolio. In the single-bond case there is only one traded asset so portfolio
composition is fixed. But in the two-bond case there are two traded assets so there is a
optimal policy and inflation targeting equilibria for either the autarky or single-bond cases.
14Notice in Table 2 that, for the two-bond case, the divergence between optimal policy and inflation
targeting is at its smallest at  = 05 and rises for values of  away from 0.5. This contrasts with the
autarky and single-bond cases where the divergence is at it largest at  = 05 This contrast is again due
to the fact that the income and substitution effects of terms of trade changes almost perfectly cancel in
the vicinity of  = 1. This in turn implies that the trade balance is relatively insensitive to changes in
the terms of trade generated by TFP shocks. Another way to view this is that (as shown by Cole and
Obstfeld (1991)), in the vicinity of  = 1 movements in the terms of trade provide a significant degree
of hedging against TFP shocks. This allows portfolio allocation across the two bonds to be more focused
on hedging of taste shocks. With the combination of the terms of trade movements and bond portfolios
providing significant risk sharing in the vicinity of  = 1 there is less need for optimal monetary policy
to deviate from inflation stabilisation.
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portfolio allocation decision. The existence of the portfolio allocation decision gives the
policymaker a qualitatively different channel by which to influence the equilibrium degree
of risk sharing and this new channel has a qualitatively and quantitatively important
effect on the optimal policy rule. In the two-bond case the policymaker can implicitly use
monetary policy to alter the risk sharing properties of the two bonds, and can therefore
influence the equilibrium portfolio, in such a way that the equilibrium portfolio provides a
significantly higher degree of risk sharing compared to an inflation targeting equilibrium.
This can be a powerful incentive for the policymaker to deviate from strict inflation
targeting. This portfolio allocation incentive, by definition, does not exist in the autarky
or single-bond cases and this explains the significant differences between the two-bond
case and the autarky and single-bond cases.
This process is illustrated in more detail in Figure 1. This figure is based on the
benchmark parameter set given in Table 1 with the international trade elasticity,  set
equal to 1.5. It therefore corresponds to one of the cases reported in Table 2. So it
can be noted from Table 2 that the optimal value of D is approximately −1686 Panel
(a) in Figure 1 plots welfare against D and shows that welfare at the optimal value of
D is approximately 00036% above welfare at strict inflation targeting (D = 0) (which
again corresponds to the number reported in Table 2).15 Panel (b) shows the standard
deviation of PPI inflation at the optimal value of D is approximately 001% while Panel
(c) shows that the standard deviation of D is reduced by optimal policy by a factor of
4 when compared to strict inflation targeting (i.e. from 139% to 033%). Panel (c)
also shows that optimal policy implies a very significant reduction in the volatility of the
real exchange rate gap compared to strict inflation targeting (i.e. from 113% for strict
inflation targeting to 027% for optimal policy).
The main mechanism behind these effects is illustrated in relation to portfolio alloca-
tions and asset returns in Panels (d) and (e) of Figure 1. Panel (d) shows how equilibrium
portfolio allocation depends on the choice of the parameter D Panel (d) shows that this
portfolio position rises from approximately 23 times steady state GDP at D = 0 (strict
inflation targeting) to approximately 31 times steady state GDP at D = −1686 (optimal
policy), so monetary policy has a significant impact on portfolio holdings. This is clearly
an important part of the mechanism which allows optimal policy to reduce deviations
from perfect risk sharing.
15Where welfare is measured as a percentage of steady state equivalent consumption. In Figure 1 Panel
(a) this is normalised to be zero at inflation targeting.
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Figure 1: Portfolio Allocation and the Monetary Policy Rule
The policy parameter, δ
D
, is plotted on the horizontal axis in each panel.
But the role played by portfolio allocation can be understood more clearly if one
considers the nature of imperfect risk sharing in this simple model. There are two inde-
pendent sources of risk faced by households - TFP shocks and taste shocks. But there is
only one degree of freedom in portfolio choices to allow hedging against these two sources
of risk. The equilibrium portfolio is therefore a compromise between hedging the two
different sources of risk. The degree of compromise can be illustrated by comparing two
alternative ‘shadow worlds’ - one where there are only TFP shocks and one where there
are only taste shocks. In each of these worlds there is a ‘shadow portfolio allocation’
which maximises welfare.16 The divergence between these two alternative shadow port-
folio allocations is a measure of the conflict between hedging the two sources of shocks.
So, if the shadow portfolio allocations are very different, one can say that there is a
significant ‘hedging conflict’ in the choice of a portfolio designed to hedge both shocks
simultaneously, i.e. the compromise portfolio is likely to offer limited hedging against
one or other (or both) shocks. While, if the shadow portfolios are very similar, one can
say that the ‘hedging conflict’ is less severe - i.e. a compromise portfolio is likely to be a
good hedge against both shocks.
Panel (d) illustrates how these two shadow portfolio allocations depend on the policy
parameter D In particular, these plots show that the degree of divergence between the
two shadow portfolio allocations, and thus the degree of conflict between hedging the two
sources of shocks, depends on D Panel (d) shows how the policy maker can ease the
conflict between hedging TFP shocks and hedging taste shocks by making an appropriate
choice of the policy parameter D It is apparent from Panel (d) that the optimal choice
of D (D = −1686) significantly reduces the divergence between the shadow portfolio
allocations and thus allows the equilibrium portfolio allocation to become simultaneously
a good hedge against both sources of risk. It is this that allows optimal policy to generate
16Note that, for any single shock or combination of shocks, the welfare maximising portfolio is not
necessarily equal to the market equilibrium portfolio (as yielded by the Devereux and Sutherland (2011a)
approach). This is because the endogenous discount factor defined in (2) implies an externality in portfolio
selection. Individual households treat aggregate consumption as exogenous when selecting their portfolio
position while a welfare maximising policymaker would internalise this effect. The shadow portfolios
shown in the figure are based on maximising welfare and therefore differ from the portfolios that would
be selected by households in the presence of each shock. The welfare maximising shadow portfolios are
relevant here because, in this exercise, we are illustrating the incentives faced by the policymaker in
choosing the policy rule. The shadow portfolios are computed using a search algorithm that maximises
welfare (as measured by (7)) in the presence of each individual source of shock and for each value of the
policy parameter, D.
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a significant reduction in deviations for perfect risk sharing.17
Note, of course, that any deviation of policy from strict inflation targeting generates
inflation volatility, which (given sticky nominal prices) has a negative effect on welfare,
so optimal policy is a compromise between inflation volatility and deviations from risk
sharing.
Panel (d) illustrates the impact of policy on portfolio and shadow portfolio allocations.
But further insight into the effects of policy on portfolio allocations can be found in Panel
(e). This panel shows the impact effect of each shock on the return differential between the
two bonds. The size and sign of these effects are key determinants of the equilibrium and
shadow portfolio allocations. Panel (e) shows that the policy parameter has a significant
influence on the impact effects of shocks on the return differential so it is evident that
this link is an important part of the mechanism that allows monetary policy to affect
portfolio allocations.18
Figure 1 shows clearly how portfolio allocation plays an important role in the policy
transmission mechanism. In particular, these results show that policy has a potentially
important role in easing the hedging conflict that arises when there are more sources of
risk than degrees of freedom in portfolio allocation. However, it should be clear from this
explanation, that this mechanism can only be important if a hedging conflict exists in the
first place. The example illustrated in our simple benchmark model is one where TFP
shocks and taste shocks create a significant hedging conflict. We will show below that
these two sources of shocks continue to create a hedging conflict in a more general model.
But we also show that other combinations of shocks may not give rise to such a significant
hedging conflict. In these cases, the optimal policy rule is much closer to strict inflation
17Note that the externality contained within the endogenous discount factors (which generates a differ-
ence between the equilibrium portfolio allocation and the welfare maximising portfolio allocation) implies
that it is not possible for policy to achieve perfect risk sharing by choice of D Note also that this same
externality also implies that the market equilibrium portfolio will not yield full risk sharing even in a
case where there are sufficient assets to span the space of shocks. In principle in the two-bond model
this implies that there would be a policy trade-off between inflation stabilisation and risk sharing even if
there is only one source of shocks (and thus no hedging conflict). Numerical experiments with the basic
model show that this effect is quantitively extremely small and therefore has no significant quantitive
implications for the main focus of analysis in this paper.
18The hedging properties of a portfolio position depend on how the return differential (i.e. the difference
between the return on the home bond and the foreign bond) responds on impact to the two shocks. Note,
however, that there are a number of interacting factors which determine the equilibrium and shadow
portfolios, so it is not possible to draw a simple link between the effects of the policy parameter on
return differentials in Panel (e) and the shadow portfolio allocations shown in Panel (d).
20
targeting - so it will become clear that the particular combination of shocks chosen in our
benchmark model is a critical factor in the results illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 1.
6 A More General Model
In this section we generalise the basic model in a number of directions. We add four
additional sources of risk: labour supply shocks, news shocks, government spending shocks
and price mark-up shocks. We add more assets and consider a more general policy rule.
We also consider the effects of local currency pricing. Note that as in the basic model,
the number of assets in the extended model is insufficient to provide hedging against the
full range of shocks, so financial markets continue to be incomplete.

















where ∆ are stochastic preference shocks which affect labour supply. We assume ∆ =
∆̄ exp(∆̂) where ∆̂ = ∆∆̂−1 + ∆ 0 ≤ ∆  1 and ∆ is a zero-mean normally
distributed i.i.d. shock with  [∆] = 
2
∆
Total factor productivity,  is now defined as follows:
 =  − 
where
 = −1 +  +   = −1 + 
where    and  and  are zero mean normally distributed i.i.d. shocks with
 [ ] = 
2
 and  [] = 
2
. This structure captures the concept of news shocks as
in Beaudry and Portier (2006).19
We add a government sector where total government expenditure is assumed to be
exogenous and subject to stochastic shocks. In particular we assume that  = ̄ exp(̂)
is government spending where ̂ = ̂−1 + , 0 ≤   1 and  is a zero-mean
normally distributed i.i.d. shock with  [] = 
2
. All government spending is assumed
19In the absence of shocks to  this structure yields TFP shocks of exactly the same form as in the
simple model, so  captures contemporaneous innovations in TFP. News shocks on the other hand are
represented by . So, for instance, given the assumption that    a positive realisation of 
raises the expected future time path of TFP for +1 onwards (i.e.  contains news about future TFP)
but has no impact on TFP in period .
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to be financed via lump sum taxes on households,  and firms,   The government
budget constraint is  = + where it is assumed that  = (1−)
and  =  where  is a fixed parameter which determines the share of profit
taxes in the overall tax take.  is the price index of government purchased goods. It is
assumed that government spending is on domestically produced goods so  = 
The household budget constraint is modified to include 
Monopoly power in the final goods sector implies that final goods prices are subject
to a mark-up given by  = (−1) In the benchmark model the mark-up is assumed
to be fixed. In the extended model the mark-up is assumed to be subject to stochastic
shocks such that  = ̄ exp(̂) where ̂ = ̂−1 + , 0 ≤   1 and  is a
zero-mean normally distributed i.i.d. shock with  [] = 
2
.
In the extended analysis of the model we allow for local currency pricing (LCP). In
the LCP case final good firm  chooses () in home currency and 
∗
() in foreign
currency to maximize (6) where () is replaced by 
∗
()+.
The extended model allows for trade in equities. Home equities represent a claim on
aggregate profits of all firms in the home final and intermediate sectors. The real payoff
to a unit of the home equity purchased in period  is defined to be Π+1 + +1, where
+1 is the real price of home equity and Π+1 is real aggregate profits. Thus the gross
real rate of return on the home equity is +1 = (Π+1 + +1). Foreign equities
are similarly defined. Total dividends aggregated across al intermediate and final goods







The benchmark parameter values assumed for the additional parameters in the ex-
tended model are shown in Table 3. Again these parameter values are based on Corsetti
et al (2010, 2018) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2005, 2007).
6.1 A general policy rule
We extend the simple policy rule used in the simple model to include a number of terms
which capture additional welfare gaps. The generalised rule takes the following form:
(̂ − ̂−1) + (1− )(̂ − ̂−1) + D(D −D−1) +  ( − −1)
+( − −1) + L(L − L−1) = 0 (10)
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Table 3: Parameter Values in the extended model
Share of government spending in output  = 02
Share of profit taxes in total taxes  = 015
TFP and news shocks  = 09  = 0019
 = 095  = 0006
Labour supply shocks ∆ = 09 ∆ = 0025
Mark-up shocks  = 00  = 00015
Government spending shocks  = 09  = 0003
where D and ̂ − ̂−1 again capture PPI inflation and deviations from perfect risk
sharing. The additional terms are based on ,  and L. These are defined as follows
 = ̂ − ̂ 
 = ̂ − ̂ 
L = ̂ − ̂ − ̂ ∗
where the superscript  indicates the first best value of a variable and  is the terms of
trade. Thus  is a measure of the output gap,  is a measure of the terms of trade
gap and L is a measure of the deviation from the law of one price. There is an analogous
targeting rule for the foreign economy.
The targeting rule in (10) now contains six terms. The first two terms represent
a weighted average of producer price (PPI) and consumer price (CPI) inflation. This
captures the result shown by Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) that, for general parameter
combinations, in the case of LCP the welfare-relevant measure of inflation is effectively a
weighted average of PPI and CPI inflation.
The fourth term in (10) measures the welfare-relevant output gap. The role of the
output gap in optimal targeting rules in New Keynesian models is well-known and needs
no further explanation.
The fifth term in the targeting rule measures the welfare-relevant terms-of-trade gap.
As Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) explain in detail, in an open economy, because there are
different baskets of goods produced in different countries, shocks may have distortionary
effects on the relative price of these different baskets. These distortions are welfare
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reducing in the same way as the within-country price distortions generated by inflation
are welfare reducing. The terms of trade gap therefore plays the same role in the monetary
policy rule as the CPI and PPI inflation terms.
The final term in the targeting rule captures the welfare reducing effects of deviations
from the law of one price. Such deviations are a direct consequence of (and only arise
from) local currency pricing. In a similar way to the price distortions caused by stag-
gered pricing, deviations from the law of one price are a form of price distortion which
potentially requires a monetary policy response.
Note that policy rule (10) contains strict CPI and PPI inflation targeting as special
cases. Strict CPI inflation targeting is given by  =  =  = D = L = 0 and strict
PPI inflation targeting is given by  = 1,  =  = D = L = 0
Given the generalised rule, there are now five policy coefficients to be chosen by the
policymaker. Our policy optimisation problem now involves a grid search across these
five coefficients, i.e.      D and L, in order to identify the parameter combination
which maximises the unconditional expectation of period welfare (as defined in (7)).
It should be noted that, while this rule is a significant generalisation of the simple ruled
used in our basic analysis, we do not claim that this methodology necessarily computes
fully optimal policy for our model. Our optimal rule is simply the optimal rule within
the restricted class of rules defined by (10).
6.2 Optimal policy in the general model: PCP and LCP
Results relating to the generalised model are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 shows
the PCP case and Table 5 shows the LCP case. Both tables show results for a range of
values of the international trade elasticity,  from 0.25 to 3.20
Tables 4 and 5 report the coefficients of the optimal policy rule. It is clear that, as in
20As before, welfare is measured in terms of the equivalent percentage of steady state consumption
and standard deviations are measured in percentage terms. Portfolio holdings are measured relative
to steady state GDP. In a symmetric equilibrium (with zero net foreign assets in the steady state) a
positive holding of foreign bonds is matched by a negative (external) position in home bonds and a
positive holding of foreign equities is matched by a negative (external) holding on home equities. Hence
the portfolio position can be summarised by home holdings of foreign bonds and home holdings of foreign
equities. The foreign country portfolio is the mirror image of the home portfolio. Note that in the LCP
case we compare optimal policy to CPI inflation targeting. Engel (2011) shows that, with LCP and
perfect risk sharing, strict CPI inflation targeting is the optimal policy, so CPI inflation targeting is the
natural benchmark for comparison in the LCP case in Table 5.
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Table 4: General model: PCP
Trade elasticity,  025 05 075 15 3
Policy rule  0129 0129 0129 0129 0129
 −0021 −0068 −0204 −0007 −0003
D 0584 −0635 −0770 −1020 −0542
L 0 0 0 0 0
 1002 0996 0997 0998 0998



























St Dev PPI Inflation (optimal) 00065 00082 00104 00074 00043
St Dev Output gap (optimal) 0019 0060 0080 0095 0089
(inf tar) 0028 0093 0134 0196 0245
St Dev RER gap (optimal) 268 177 128 064 027
(inf tar) 383 275 216 132 076
Note: For each  the table shows the optimal policy rule co effi cients, the welfare diff erence b etween optimal policy and inflation
targeting, standard deviations and equilib rium portfo lios for optim al p olicy and inflation targeting. Welfare is m easured in term s
of the equivalent p ercentage of steady-state consumption. Standard dev iations are measured in p ercentages. Portfo lio hold ings are
measured relative to steady state GDP.
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Table 5: General model: LCP
Trade elasticity,  025 05 075 15 3
Policy rule  0136 2025 0188 0138 0127
 −0965 −0181 −0316 −0299 −0201
D −0143 −1829 −2029 −1099 −1626
L 1912 0358 0535 0452 0262
 0311 0334 0352 0332 0334



























St Dev CPI Inflation (optimal) 0053 0048 0043 0029 0020
St Dev Output gap (optimal) 0037 0102 0145 0208 0240
(inf tar) 0076 0148 0198 0275 0328
St Dev RER gap (optimal) 281 202 168 143 140
(inf tar) 367 269 220 165 142
Note: For each  the table shows the optim al p olicy rule co effi cients, the welfare diff erence b etween optim al p olicy and inflation
targeting, standard deviations and equ ilibrium portfo lios for optim al p olicy and inflation targeting. Welfare is measured in term s
of the equivalent p ercentage of steady-state consumption. Standard deviations are m easured in p ercentages. Portfo lio hold ings are
m easured relative to steady state GDP.
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the case of the simple model considered above, optimal policy implies quite a significant
departure from inflation targeting in terms of the policy rule coefficients. Recall that
strict PPI inflation targeting implies  = 1,  =  = D = L = 0 and strict CPI
inflation targeting implies  =  =  = D = L = 0. Tables 4 and 5 show that
optimal policy implies relatively large values (in absolute terms) for the coefficient on the
risk sharing gap, D so as emphasised in the context of the simplified model, optimal
policy requires a strong response to the departures from full risk sharing that arise because
of the incomplete market structure.
Tables 4 and 5 show the difference in welfare between optimal policy and a policy of
inflation targeting. This difference is of the same order of magnitude as in the simple
model. Notice that, contrary to the argument of Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) there does
not appear to be a significant difference between the PCP and LCP cases in terms of the
size of the welfare benefit of optimal policy.21
The lower half of Tables 4 and 5 show the implications of optimal policy and inflation
targeting for the volatility of a number of variables. As emphasised in the context of the
simple model, optimal policy implies quite significant stabilisation of the output gap and
the real exchange rate gap relative to strict inflation targeting. Again this is true in both
the PCP and LCP cases.
The cases analysed in Tables 4 and 5 are based on trade in both equities and bonds.
It is useful to compare the results yielded by the two-bond-two-equity case to those
yielded by other financial market structures. To do this we concentrate on the impact of
optimal policy on the volatility of the real exchange rate and we focus on the PCP case.
This is sufficient to illustrate the difference between financial market structures. Table
6 compares results for the two-bonds-two-equites case with autarky and a single non-
contingent bond. The numbers shown in this table are the ratio of the standard deviation
of the real exchange rate yielded by optimal policy relative to the standard deviation
yielded by inflation targeting. The lower the reported number the more stabilising optimal
policy is relative to inflation targeting, while a reported number close to unity implies
almost no stabilising effect of optimal policy relative to inflation targeting.
21LCP plays a significant role in Corsetti et al (2010, 2018) because their welfare results are most
significant when the trade balance is insensitive to changes in the terms of trade or when the terms
of trade are insensitive to change in the nominal exchange rate (i.e. the LCP case). Our results are
driven by the link between portfolio allocation and monetary policy. This link is relatively independent
of whether firms are following PCP or LCP strategies, hence there are no significant differences between
the results in Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 6: Alternative financial market structures (PCP)
Trade elasticity,  025 05 075 15 3
Bonds and equities 070 064 059 048 036
Single bond 098 087 100 100 100
Autarky 099 093 099 100 100
Note: The numbers shown in th is table are the ratio of the standard deviation of the real exchange rate
yielded by optimal policy relative to the standard deviation yielded by inflation targeting.
It is apparent that, for values of  not close to 12, the stabilising effect of optimal
policy is very small in the autarky and single-bond cases. It is only when  is close to 1/2
that the stabilising effect of optimal policy is non-trivial. By contrast, in the two-bonds-
two-equites case the stabilising effect of optimal policy is significant at all values of 
These results match the results derived in the simple model and they confirm that the
basic mechanism illustrated in Figure 1 continues to operate in the more general model.22
6.3 Different Combinations of shocks
The results reported in Tables 4 and 5 confirm that the results illustrated in the simple
model carry over to a more general structure. Note however, in the context of the
simple model, the mechanism that generated large differences between optimal policy
and inflation targeting depended on the trade-off between choosing a portfolio that could
hedge two different sources of shocks. In the case of the simple model this was the trade-
off between hedging TFP shocks and taste shocks. The generalised model contains 6
types of shock. It is useful to consider the role of each shock in generating a hedging
trade-off. To do this we consider the implications of removing each source of shock in
22Notice in Tables 4 and 5 that, unlike in the two-bond case in Table 2, the divergence between optimal
policy and inflation targeting does not appear to decline in the vicinity of  = 1 The special role of
 = 1 arises in the simple model in Table 2 because there are only two sources of shocks. As explained
above, in the vicinity of  = 1 the terms of trade provide hedging against TFP shocks and, in the
simple model, allows bond allocation to focus on taste shocks. The general model illustrated in Tables
4 and 5 contains multiple sources of risk so the hedging properties of the terms of trade in the vicinity
of  = 1 are much less significant.
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turn (while retaining the other five). Table 8 shows the stabilising effect of optimal policy
(i.e. the ratio of the standard deviation of the real exchange rate gap yield by optimal
policy relative to inflation targeting). Here we focus on the PCP case with  = 15. In
each column we remove one shock and retain the other five.
Table 7 shows clearly that it is taste shocks that are particularly important in gener-
ating a hedging conflict. It is only when taste shocks are present (in combination with the
other shocks) that optimal policy generates a significant degree of stabilisation relative to
inflation targeting. When taste shocks are excluded there is virtually no stabilising effect
of optimal policy relative to inflation targeting. This indicates that the other five shocks,
even though they are uncorrelated with each other, produce effects on asset returns and
the marginal utility of consumption that are so similar that the equilibrium portfolio of
bonds and equities provides a good hedge for all shocks regardless of the choice of policy
rule coefficients. Taste shocks, on the other hand, appear to generate effects on asset
returns and marginal utility which are very different from the effects of the other shocks,
so taste shocks create a hedging conflict with the other shocks which does not otherwise
arise.
The results illustrated in Table 7 obviously raises the question: why do taste shocks
play such a significant role? That answer to this is that taste shocks, by their very nature,
directly impinge on the marginal utility of consumption. All of the other five shocks only
indirectly affect the marginal utility of consumption via their effects on household dispos-
able income. Any portfolio which hedges disposable income fluctuations will therefore be
a reasonably good hedge against all the other five shocks simultaneously, while it may or
may not be a good hedge against taste shocks.23 A further intriguing question therefore
arises: are there other forms of shock which give rise to a hedging conflict of the form
generated by taste shocks? We leave this question to further research.
6.4 Parameter variations
We now briefly consider the effects of varying a number of key parameters away from their
benchmark values. Table 8 summarises the effects of varying the share of home and foreign
goods in the consumption basket,  the degree of risk aversion,  and the elasticity of
labour supply, 1 For each parameter variation we show a range of values for  and for
23Indeed, once taste shocks are excluded, not only is there is no significant hedging conflict between
the other five shocks, it also appears that the available assets are such a good hedge against those five
shocks that there is in any case no significant trade-off between inflation targeting and risk sharing.
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Policy rule  0129 0129 0129 0129 0000
 −0013 −0026 −0049 0001 0000
D −1349 −0565 0977 −0016 −0986
L 0 0 0 0 0
 0998 1000 0996 0999 0997



























St Dev PPI Inflation (optimal) 00060 00055 00084 00031 00063
St Dev Output gap (optimal) 0042 0095 0093 0089 0093
(inf tar) 0167 0196 0195 0092 0194
St Dev RER gap (optimal) 026 063 062 060 063
(inf tar) 112 132 132 060 132
Note: Each column in this tab le shows the outcom e when one typ e of sho ck is om itted. Each column shows the optim al p olicy rule
co effi cients, the welfare diff erence b etween optim al p olicy and inflation targeting, standard deviations and equilibrium portfo lios
for optim al p olicy and inflation targeting. Welfare is m easured in term s of the equ ivalent p ercentage of steady-state consumption.
Standard deviations are measured in p ercentages. Portfo lio hold ings are m easured relative to steady state GDP.
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Table 8: Parameter variations
Welfare difference1 St Dev RER gap2
 05 15 05 15
 06 00040 00045 028 024
07 00037 00044 041 028
08 00033 00041 055 037
09 00029 00037 067 053
 05 00025 00037 084 075
1 00026 00036 077 064
2 00030 00038 064 048
5 00042 00052 040 026
 05 00033 00050 061 050
2 00030 00038 064 048
5 00028 00033 068 047
9 00027 00032 069 047
1. Welfare diff erence b etween optimal and inflation targeting
2. StDev(optimal policy)/StDev(inflation targeting)
each parameter combination we show the welfare difference between optimal policy and
inflation targeting and also the ratio of the standard deviation of the real exchange rate
gap for optimal policy relative to the standard deviation for inflation targeting.
The first set of results in Table 8 shows the effects of varying the share of home and
foreign goods in the consumption basket, . This can be thought of as a measure of
openness, where a value of  close to 0.5 implies a more open economy and a value of 
close to unity implies a less open economy. The results in Table 8 show that the welfare
gains from optimal policy are marginally larger for more open economies. It also appears
that the stabilising effect of optimal policy on the real exchange rate gap is also more
significant for more open economies.
The second set of results in Table 8 show the effects of varying the degree of risk
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aversion, The results show that the welfare gains for optimal policy appear to increase as
risk aversion increases. The stabilising effect on the real exchange rate gap also increases
as risk aversion increases.
The third set of results in Table 8 show the effects of varying the elasticity of labour
supply, 1 The results show that the welfare gains from optimal policy are higher when
labour supply is more elastic. The labour supply elasticity has only a minor effect on the
stabilising effect of optimal policy on the real exchange rate gap.
Table 9 shows the effect of varying the parameter  in the endogenous discount factor
(for the case where  = 15). This table shows that, in contrast to the effects of the
parameters shown in Table 8, varying  has a potentially very significant effect on the
size of welfare gains. A very small value of  implies that the discount factor adjusts
very gradually to changes in aggregate consumption. This in turn implies that transitory
shocks can have very long lasting effects on net foreign assets. In the absence of any
deliberate policy response, this tends to raise the variance of consumption and work
effort and thus has potentially strong negative effects on welfare. Optimal policy tends to
counter these effects by placing a stronger emphasis on the risk sharing gap in the policy
rule (i.e. the parameter D) for low values of  (as can be seen in Table 9). A policy of
inflation targeting on the other hand ignores the implications of volatile net foreign assets
for welfare and thus the welfare performance of inflation targeting is significantly lower
than optimal policy when  is small. It therefore follows that, as shown in Table 9, the
welfare gain from optimal policy is larger for small values of  Note however that, for
small values of  the variances of consumption and work effort are unrealistically large,
so the large welfare gains from optimisation are not empirically plausible.
7 Conclusions
Recent literature on monetary policy in open economies (Corsetti et al, 2010, 2018)
shows that, when international financial trade is absent or restricted to a single non-
contingent bond, there are significant internal and external trade-offs that prevent optimal
policy from simultaneously closing all welfare gaps. In this case optimal monetary policy
deviates from inflation targeting in order to offset real exchange rate misalignments.
These simple models of financial market incompleteness provide important theoretical
insights but they are obviously not good representations of modern financial markets.
This paper therefore develops a more realistic model of incomplete markets, where there
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Table 9: Alternative values for 
 00001 00005 0001 0005 001
Policy rule  0129 0129 0129 0129 0129
 0004 0004 0002 −0007 −0012
D −202 −572 −337 −102 −0621
L 0 0 0 0 0
 0999 0999 0999 0998 0996



























PPI Inflation (optimal) 00049 00053 00057 00074 00087
Output gap (optimal) 0023 0035 0046 0095 0131
(inf tar) 1064 0483 0349 0196 0188
RER gap (optimal) 010 021 029 064 088
(inf tar) 724 328 237 132 127
Note: Each column shows the optimal policy ru le co effi cients, the welfare diff erence b etween optim al p olicy and inflation
targeting, standard deviations and equilibrium portfolios for optim al p olicy and inflation targeting. Welfare is m easured in
term s of the equivalent p ercentage of steady-state consumption . Standard deviations are m easured in p ercentages.
Portfo lio hold ings are m easured relative to steady state GDP.
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is international trade in multiple assets. The analysis shows that the presence of multiple
assets creates a potentially powerful interaction between monetary policy and household
portfolio allocation. This interaction is, by definition, not present when there is financial
autarky or a single tradeable bond and this paper shows that the interaction with portfolio
allocation can imply that optimal monetary policy generates a quantitatively much more
significant stabilisation of the real exchange rate gap than implied by simpler models of
financial market incompleteness.
This paper focuses on a model of imperfect financial markets where the imperfection
simply takes the form of a restricted set of financial instruments (i.e. bonds and equities)
which is insufficient to provide full international risk sharing. Devereux and Sutherland
(2011b) show that the presence of collateral constraints can significantly alter the inter-
national transmission of shocks, especially in the case when there is trade in bonds and
equity. In a companion paper (Senay and Sutherland, 2016) we analyse optimal monetary
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